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Abstract
Cloud systems, also known as cloud services, are among the primary solutions of the
information technology domain. Cloud services are accessed through an identity authentication
process. These authentication processes have become increasingly vulnerable to adversaries
who may perform denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to make cloud services inaccessible. Several
strong authentication protocols have been employed to protect conventional network systems.
Nevertheless, they can cause a DoS threat when implemented in the cloud-computing system.
This is because the comprehensive verification process may exhaust the cloud resources and
shut down cloud’s services. This thesis proposes a novel cloud-based secure authentication
(CSA) protocol suite that provides a smart authentication approach not only for verifying the
users’ identities but also for building a strong line of defense against the DoS attacks. CSA
protocol suite offers two modules, CSAM-1 and CSAM-2. The decision of which module of
CSA to be utilized depends on the deployment nature of the cloud computing.
CSAM-1 is designed to prevent external risks of DoS attacks in private and community cloud
computing. CSAM-1 utilizes multiple techniques that include the client puzzle problem and
utilization of unique encrypted text (UET). Therefore, these techniques can distinguish
between a legitimate user’s request and an attacker’s attempt.
CSAM-2 is designed to prevent internal risks of DoS attacks in public and hybrid cloud
computing. CSAM-2 combines an extended unique encrypted text (EUET) application, client
puzzle problem, and deadlock avoidance algorithm to prevent DoS risks that occur from inside
cloud computing systems. The authentication process in both modules is designed so that the
cloud-based servers become footprint-free and fully able to detect the signs of DoS attacks.
The reliability and scalability of these two modules have been measured through a number of
experiments using the GreenCloud simulation tool. The experiments’ results have shown that
the CSA protocol suite is practically applicable as a lightweight authentication protocol. These
experiments have verified the ability of the CSA to protect the cloud-based system against DoS
attacks with an acceptable mean time to failure while still having the spare capacity to handle
a large number of user requests.
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Chapter 1
1

Introduction

Security and reliability are important in the cloud computing environment. This is
especially true today because denial-of-service (DoS) attacks constitute one of the largest
threats to Internet users and cloud computing services. DoS attacks target the resources of
these services, thereby lowering their ability to provide optimum usage of the network
infrastructure. Owing to the nature of cloud computing, the methodologies for preventing
or mitigating DoS attacks are quite different compared to those used in conventional
networks. This chapter discusses the motivation and objectives of this research. It
additionally explains the research methodology and the main contributions. Finally, this
chapter describes the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Research Motivation
Addressing DoS attacks for all service models in cloud systems is a major challenge owing
to the difficulty of distinguishing an attacker’s attempt from a legitimate user’s request,
even though the requests originate from different distributed machines. DoS attacks affect
all cloud system service models—Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service
(PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS)—and can occur from outside or from inside the
cloud environment.
External cloud-based DoS attacks are initiated from outside the cloud environment and
target cloud-based services. These attacks occur from outside the cloud system and target
SaaS and PaaS models. This type of attack affects the availability of services.
Internal cloud-based DoS attacks raise from the cloud system itself, such as within the PaaS
or IaaS model. This attack type can occur in several ways. For example, the attacker may
exploit the trial period of the cloud service of a vendor. Consequently, an authorized user
within the cloud environment can internally launch a DoS attack on the victim’s machine.
Moreover, sharing infected virtual machine (VM) images can allow an attacker to control
and utilize the infected VMs to execute an internal DoS attack on the targeted machine
within the same cloud-computing system.
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The case scenarios that demonstrate how internal and external DoS attacks affect cloudcomputing systems are described as follows.
1. Case Scenario-1 E-mall Company External DoS Attack.
E-Mall Company, which provides a web-based e-commerce service to their visitors and
members, decided to move to a cloud-based hosting service. They agreed to migrate
their service to Whatchamacallit Elastic Compute Cloud (WEC2) and utilize the
Whatchamacallit Elastic Block Store (WEBS) service for their data storage. However,
three months after the implementation of the cloud service, the E-Mall service became
unavailable to their members and visitors for more than 16 hours. Neither could E-Mall
Company control the circumstances nor could they address the cause of the
unavailability of the service. They contacted Whatchamacallit support and were
informed, “that E-Mall Company had somehow exhausted all its available bandwidth.”
E-Mall Company notified the Whatchamacallit support representative that their records
indicated that only 150 transactions had been processed and that only 1,050 users were
online when the services terminated. After some time, E-Mall Company was intimated,
“that their bandwidth was consumed by the flood of innumerable User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) packets that were targeted at their IP.” This attack caused
approximately 16 hours of service unavailability. Consequently, the E-Mall Company
incurred the following costs:
- Owing to the nature of cloud computing and based on the WEC2 service
agreement, the E-Mall Company was responsible for the bandwidth usage
consumed during the DoS attack. The average cost of the bandwidth usage was
$0.10 per GB.
- The web-based e-commerce system was unavailable resulting in a loss of
approximately $50,000 worth sale transactions.
2. Case Scenario-2 E-mall Company Internal DoS Attack:
The second scenario is an internal DoS attack that occurred at the E-Mall Company
two days following the resolution of the first DoS attack. During this attack, the website
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of E-Mall Company was unable to access the WEBS to store or retrieve data. The
response they received was, “that multiple transactions were performed on the data
storage system triggering an extended communication response time with the
database.”

E-Mall Company “observed that their logs indicated that database

transactions occurred at average levels when compared to their transaction volumes
over the previous three months.” Following an investigation by Whatchamacallit, “it
was discovered that a flood of TCP SYN connection requests affected the data-storage
service.” WEBS service is an internal service and is not related directly to the
customers’ systems. Therefore, the second attack, which affected the data-storage
system, occurred through another virtual machine in the WEC2 environment.
Whatchamacallit explained “that the second DoS attack differed from the first attack
in that it was an internal DoS attack. It was mentioned that an owner of another virtual
server within the cloud environment caused seven other virtual machines to flood the
WEBS service concurrently by sending forged requests. Therefore, the WEBS response
time was extremely slow during the attack.” As a result, E-Mall Company reported the
following losses:
- E-Mall Company lost approximately $6,000 worth sales transactions because
of the unavailability of the data for two hours.
- E-Mall Company lost 1,000 customers because the customers were frustrated
by the effects of the internal DoS attack. They were not able to browse the EMall services as easily as they could browse for the services of other competing
firms.
Owing to the above challenges, defending cloud-computing systems against the different
types of DoS attacks is an important research issue. The defense objective is to maintain
cloud system availability and avoid the attacks’ overloaded resource usage, which can
cause financial losses. Accordingly, this research strives to:
-

Develop methods to effectively protect cloud-based systems against external DoS
attacks using strong authentication protocols that are targeted to external DoS
attacks.

4

-

Develop an approach to effectively defend cloud-based systems against internal
DoS attacks by employing strong authentication protocols that are targeted to
internal DoS attacks.

In addition, this research analyzes and validates the proposed cloud-based authentication
protocol suite against both external and internal DoS attacks. The full scope of research
objectives are described in the following section.

1.2 Research Objectives
The main goal of this thesis is designing and developing a novel cloud-based authentication
protocol suite to securely authenticate the cloud user and to prevent risks of external and
internal DoS attacks. The research objectives established to achieve the research goal are
as follows:
1. Investigate DoS attacks in conventional networks and then identify DoS attacks in
cloud-computing systems. The tasks for achieving this objective are to:
-

Explore the risks of DoS attacks.

-

Study existing types of DoS attacks in conventional network systems.

-

Examine existing defense mechanisms against DoS attacks in conventional
network systems.

-

Evaluate the ability of cloud-computing systems to detect DoS attacks.

-

Identify and categorize all possible types of DoS attacks in cloud-computing
systems.

2. Investigate, propose, and validate a protocol suite that defends the cloud-based system
against external DoS attacks. The tasks to achieve this objective are to:
-

Design a cloud-based authentication protocol to defend the system against
external DoS attacks.

-

Analyze and validate the security and performance of the proposed cloud-based
authentication protocol.

3. Investigate, develop, and validate a defender protocol suite against internal DoS
attacks. The following tasks to accomplish this objective are to:
-

Develop a cloud-based authentication protocol to prevent internal DoS attacks.
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-

Analyze and validate the security and performance of the proposed cloud-based
authentication protocol.

1.3 Research Methodology
This section describes the methodologies that are applied in this research to design and
develop the cloud-based authentication protocol suite that defends against external and
internal DoS attacks. The proposed cloud-based authentication protocol suite can not only
detect internal DoS threats, but it can also defend the system against external DoS attackers.
In addition, the developed protocol satisfies the following security requirements:
-

Multilevel adaptive technique that determines the efforts of the protocol
participants.

-

Ability to identify a legitimate user’s requests prior to heavy authentication.

-

Footprint-free core protocol.

-

Formal validation of the protocol.

-

Experimental validation of the protocol.

1.3.1

Defender Protocol Suite Design

The identity authentication protocol is believed to have become increasingly susceptible to
attackers who use DoS techniques. A cloud-based authentication protocol that securely
authenticates a cloud user and effectively prevents DoS attacks on the cloud-computing
system is needed. In this thesis, we propose a cloud-based DoS-resistance protocol suite
that securely authenticates cloud users. This protocol is designed such that the cloud server
is required to do lightweight computation work without the need to store any data during
the authentication process. In addition, it requires the cloud user to do a process that is
computationally expensive.
To realize the Meadows cost-based approach (Meadows, 2001), this protocol suite
considers a “subset sum” problem as a “client puzzles” technique (Juels & Brainard, 1999)
(Chapters 3 and 4). A “subset sum” problem is a kind of cryptographic knapsack problem,
and it is not only a strong one-way function, but it also has a flexibility property to be
adaptive (Salomaa, 1996). The complexity of the subset sum knapsack problem depends
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on the size of the knapsack (the total number of its items, n) and on the number of items
(the subset sum size, m) involved in puzzle solution. If the number of items n is small, then
an exhaustive search for the solution is practical. Also, if the number of m is small
compared to n, then a solution can be found in a reasonable time. Consequently, by
adjusting the values of n and m, determining the difficultly level of the knapsack problem
and hence the cost-based approach can be adaptively realized. Therefore, the proposed
cloud-based DoS-resistance protocol suite has the ability to be configured such that the
more sensitive the services requested are, the greater the computation cost required from
the requester is. In other words, greater computation cost can be achieved by asking the
requester (client) to perform an expensive operation, such as solving an expensive subset
sum puzzle. The responder (cloud server) should conduct inexpensive to medium-cost
operations, such as generating subset sum puzzle elements, checking the solution, or
decryption operations.
A banker’s (Dijkstra, 2002) algorithm is also implemented in the second module of the
proposed protocol to control the allocation of services and to prevent the risk of an internal
DoS attack on a specific service host or virtual machine (Chapter 4).

1.3.2

Security and Performance Validation

To validate the security requirements of an identity authentication protocol, it is important
to analyze the proposed protocol via two different models. Therefore, the proposed
authentication protocol is formally analyzed via Syverson & Van Oorschot (SVO) logic
(P. F. Syverson & Van Oorschot, 1994) to validate its security requirements (Section 5.1.2).
The proposed protocol is also validated via a cost-based model approach (Meadows, 2001)
to ensure that it is invulnerable to DoS attacks (Section 5.1.1).
In addition, to validate the performance of the proposed protocol, experiments are
conducted to assess the ability of the protocol to serve as a DoS defender tool. The dynamic
programming algorithm is our tool to solve and assess the computational cost of both
participants (client and cloud server) involved in the subset sum problem. We were able to
experimentally determine different values of n and m that provide different levels of the
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subset sum solution’s complexity (Section 5.2.1). This makes our protocol adaptive enough
to protect different levels of sensitive services.
The GreenCloud simulator (Kliazovich, Bouvry, & Khan, 2012) was used to validate the
proposed protocol implementation in terms of their ability to prevent DoS attacks. A real
Linux OS was configured to collect real data regarding the properties of the high-level
computational processes of the proposed protocol. These data include the number of
million instructions per second (MIPS), the input size, the output size, and storage size of
each process. The collected data were used in the simulation as the input parameters for
simulating the protocol’s processes. Furthermore, a virtual machine (VM) was configured
as a cloud server in the simulation in order to execute the computational processes of the
protocol under extreme conditions. Then, VM data were collected from the simulation tool,
including the VM load, VM memory load, and VM storage load (Section 5.2.3). Finally,
the analysis results from the collected VM data were compared to the analysis results from
a widely used authorization protocol in the Internet (Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). The main
contributions of this thesis are detailed in the following section.

1.4 Main Thesis Contributions
This thesis focuses on designing and developing a novel authentication protocol suite to
securely authenticate the cloud user and to prevent external and internal risks of DoS
attacks. Research contribution can be mainly summarized as follows:
-

A taxonomy of existing DoS attacks and defenses on cloud-computing systems.

-

An investigation and design of a defender authentication protocol suite against
external cloud-based DoS attacks.

-

An investigation and design of a defender authentication protocol suite against
internal cloud-based DoS attacks. In addition to the performance validation of the
proposed authentication protocol.

-

A security validation of the proposed authentication protocol suite against cloudbased DoS attacks.

-

A performance evaluation of a widely used cloud-based authorization framework
in the Internet.
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The research contributions of this thesis have been published in journals and conference
proceedings in the areas of information security and cloud security. Therefore, these
contributions have been peer-reviewed by experts in the field.

1.5 Thesis Structure
The thesis structure is outlined as follows:


Chapter 2 provides an overview of cloud-computing technology and DoS attacks.
In addition, it provides a literature review of existing cloud-based DoS attacks and
defenses. Furthermore, the ability of a cloud-computing system to defend against
DoS attacks using an existing authentication protocol is also provided in this
chapter.



Chapter 3 presents and discusses the proposed cloud-based secure authentication
module 1 (CSAM-1) protocol suite that is used to defend against external DoS
attacks.



Chapter 4 presents and discusses the proposed cloud-based secure authentication
module 2 (CSAM-2) protocol suite that is employed to defend against internal DoS
attacks.



Chapter 5 describes a security and performance validation of the proposed protocol.
It provides formal verification of the protocol via SVO logic, as well as security
validation using a cost-based model. In addition, it provides an analysis of a puzzle
technique that is implemented in the proposed protocol suite. Furthermore, it
provides an evaluation of a widely used existing authorization framework. Finally,
it provides a performance validation of the proposed protocol suite.



Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of the thesis and outlines the future work.
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Chapter 2
2

Background and Literature Review

This chapter overviews the cloud computing in general and the related DoS attacks. It
presents an in-depth security analysis of DoS attacks in cloud computing. Finally, it
presents a literature review of the existing authentication protocols on cloud computing
and their ability to defend against DoS attacks.

2.1 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is the utilization of hardware and software to provide services to end
users over a network, such as the Internet (Mell & Grance, 2011). It includes a set of VMs
that simulates physical computers and provides services, such as operating systems and
applications. However, configuring virtualization in a cloud-computing environment is
critical when deploying a cloud-computing system.

Figure 2.1: Architecture of cloud computing service models
A cloud-computing structure relies on three service models (Mell & Grance, 2011): IaaS,
PaaS, and SaaS (Fig. 2.1). IaaS enables users to access physical resources, networks,
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bandwidth, and storage. PaaS builds on IaaS and provides end users with access to the
operating systems and platforms that are required for building and developing applications,
such as databases. SaaS provides end users with access to software applications.
Furthermore, cloud computing can be implemented using different deployment models, as
described below (Mell & Grance, 2011):
-

Private Cloud: This cloud model is deployed to be used by a single organization.
This deployment model could be owned, operated, and managed by the
organization itself or by a third party exclusively for the organization. It can be
located on or off the organization.

-

Community Cloud: This cloud model is deployed to be used by multiple
organizations that have shared interests such as government organizations. This
deployment model could be owned, operated and managed by one or more
organizations in the community or by a third party exclusively for the community.
It can be located on or off the organizations.

-

Public Cloud: This cloud model is deployed to be used by general public. This
deployment model could be owned, operated, and managed by, for example, a
business or an academic organization. It is located in a cloud provider.

-

Hybrid Cloud: This deployment model is a combination of two or more different
deployment models (such as private, community, or public) that communicate
together to allow application and data portability. It is to be noted that the hybrid
cloud in this research is considered as a combination of the public model and either
private, community, or both (private and community) models.

2.2 Denial-of-Service Attacks
DoS attacks are a major security risk in the cloud-computing environment, where resources
are shared by many users. A DoS attack targets resources or services to attempt to render
them unavailable by overloading system resources with substantial amounts of spurious
traffic (Mather, Kumaraswamy, & Latif, 2009). The objective of DoS attacks is to consume
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critical resources, such as memory, CPU processing space, or network bandwidth, to make
them unreachable to end users by blocking network communication or denying access to
services.
DoS attacks are becoming increasingly more sophisticated. Many websites and large
companies have been targeted by these attacks. The first DoS attack was reported in 1999
(Nazario, 2008). In 2000, large resource companies, such as Yahoo, Amazon, CNN.com,
and eBay, were targeted by DoS attacks, and their services were stopped for hours
(Neumann, 2000). Register.com was targeted by a DoS attack in 2001. It was the first DoS
attack to use domain name servers (DNSs) as reflectors (Dittrich, Mirkovic, Reiher, &
Dietrich, 2004). In 2002, a service disruption was reported at 9 of 13 DNS root servers on
account of a DNS backbone DoS attack. This attack type reoccurred in 2007 and disrupted
two DNS root servers (Arora, Kumar, & Sachdeva, 2011). In 2007, a DoS attack was
executed by thousands of computers targeting more than 10,000 online game servers
(Arora et al., 2011). In 2008, a DoS attack targeting Wordpress.com resulted in 15 minutes
of service denials (Patel & Borisagar, 2012). In 2009, GoGrid, a cloud-computing provider,
was targeted by a massive DoS attack that affected approximately half of the thousands of
customers of the provider. In 2009, Register.com was again targeted by a DoS attack. In
the same year, several social networking sites, including Facebook and Twitter, were
targeted by various DoS attacks. Many websites were affected by DoS attacks in 2010,
including the Australian Parliament House website, Optus, Web24, Vocus, and the website
of Burma’s main Internet provider. In 2011, Visa, MasterCard, PayPal, and PostFinance
were targeted by a DoS attack that aimed to support the WikiLeaks founder (Patel &
Borisagar, 2012). In the same year, the site of the National Election Commission of South
Korea was targeted by a DoS attack.
Furthermore, thousands of infected computers were used in a DoS attack that targeted the
Asian E-Commerce Company in 2011 (Patel & Borisagar, 2012). In 2012, the official
website of the office of the vice-president of Russia was unavailable for 15 hours owing to
a DoS attack (Patel & Borisagar, 2012). In the same year, many South Korean and United
States (US) websites were targeted by DoS attacks. Godaddy.com websites reported
service outages because of a DoS attack in the same year. In 2012, major US banks and
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other financial institutions became targets of a DoS attack. As evidenced by the above
cases, the volume of DoS attacks is rapidly increasing. Moreover, these attacks are
targeting major companies, which are consequently incurring significant global financial
losses.
DoS attacks, such as those above, include different types of techniques. These techniques
and their effects are outlined below.

Legitimate User
(210.21.1.5)

IP Source
(210.21.1.5)

IP Destination
(123.12.1.1)

DATA

Attacker
(196.15.10.5)

Server
(123.12.1.1)

Figure 2.2: IP spoofing attack



IP spoofing attack: In an Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing attack, packet transmissions
between the end user and cloud server are intercepted. Their headers are modified so
that the IP source field in the IP packet is forged by using either a legitimate IP address
or an unreachable IP address, as shown in Fig. 2.2. Consequently, the server responds
to the legitimate user machine, thereby affecting that machine, or the server is unable
to complete the transaction to the unreachable IP address, which affects the server
resources. Tracing such an attack is difficult because of the forged IP address in the IP
source field of the IP packet.
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Figure 2.3: (a) Normal three-way handshake; (b) SYN flooding attack



SYN flooding attack: A Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection starts with
a three-way handshake, as shown in Fig. 2.3(a). A typical three-way handshake
between a legitimate user and the server begins by sending a connection request from
the legitimate user to the server in the form of a synchronization (SYN) message.
Subsequently, the server acknowledges the SYN message by returning a request (SYNACK) to the legitimate user. Finally, the legitimate user sends an ACK request to the
server to establish the connection. SYN flooding occurs when the attacker sends
innumerable packets to the server but does not complete the three-way handshake
process. Consequently, the server waits to complete the process for all of those packets.
This prevents the server from processing legitimate requests, as shown in Fig. 2.3(b).
Moreover, SYN flooding can be executed by sending packets with a spoofed IP
address. A sniffing attack is considered a type of SYN flooding attack. In a sniffing
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attack, the attacker sends a packet with the predicted sequence number of an active
TCP connection with a spoofed IP address. Thus, the server is unable to reply to that
request, thereby affecting the performance of the cloud system because of extensive
resource consumption.
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Figure 2.4: Smurf attack



Smurf attack: In a smurf attack, the attacker sends many Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) echo requests. These requests are spoofed so that their source IP
address is the IP address of the victim, and the IP destination address is the broadcast
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IP address, as shown in Fig. 2.4. Therefore, the victim is flooded with broadcasted
addresses. In the worst case scenario, the number of hosts who reply to the ICMP echo
requests is excessively large.


Buffer-overflow attack: In a buffer-overflow attack, an attacker sends executable code
to the victim to exploit the buffer-overflow vulnerability. Consequently, the attacker
can completely control the victim machine. The attacker can subsequently either harm
that machine or use the infected machine to perform an internal cloud-based DoS
attack.

Packet size 90,000 bytes

Attacker
(196.15.10.5)

Server
(123.12.1.1)

Figure 2.5: Ping of death attack



Ping of death attack: In the ping of death attack, the attacker sends an IP packet larger
than the IP protocol limit, which is 65,535 bytes, as shown in Fig. 2.5. Processing an
oversized packet affects both the victim machine within the cloud system and the cloud
system resources.
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Figure 2.6: Land attack



Land attack: This attack uses the Land.c program to send forged TCP SYN packets
with the victim’s IP address in the source and destination fields, as shown in Fig. 2.6.
The machine receives the request from itself, which crashes the system.



Teardrop attack: This type of attack uses the Teardrop.c program to send invalid
overlapping values of IP fragments in the header of TCP packets. The victim machine
in the cloud system will crash in the re-assembly process.

2.3 Literature Review
2.3.1

DoS Defense Techniques

DoS attacks in cloud-computing environments can be externally or internally initiated, as
shown in Fig. 2.7. An external cloud-based DoS attack is launched from outside the cloud
system and targets the cloud’s services to disrupt their availability. Therefore, an external
DoS attack can affect the SaaS and PaaS models. On the other hand, an internal cloudbased DoS attack originates from inside the cloud system, primarily in the IaaS and PaaS
models. These attacks can take various forms. For example, an attacker can take advantage
of the free trial periods of some cloud service providers. Hence, an authorized user of the
cloud system may internally initiate a DoS attack on the targeted services.
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(SaaS)

User
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(PaaS)

Virtual Datacenter
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Datacenter (Location 1)

Datacenter (Location 2)

Figure 2.7: External and internal cloud-based DoS attacks
Based on an investigation of the major types of DoS attacks, we derive a taxonomy of
cloud-based DoS attacks, as illustrated in Table 2.1. Our classification is focused on cloudcomputing aspects, such as a cloud-based type of attack, as well as on recommended
practical defense mechanisms and the drawbacks of each mechanism.
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Table 2.1: Types of DoS attacks on cloud systems

Attack

Cloud-based Type

External
Internal

Recommended Practical

Limitation

Defense Mechanism
- Hop Count Filtering (HCF) in

- The attacker can build

the PaaS model (Wang, Jin, &

his/her own IP2HC

Shin, 2007)

mapping to avoid HCF
- Another compatible

IP Spoofing
External
Internal

- Trust-based approach in the

solution should be

IaaS model (Gonzalez, Anwar,

proposed to detect IP

& Joshi, 2011)

spoofing in distribution
routers

External
Internal
External

- SYN cache approach in the
PaaS model (Lemon, 2002)

- SYN cookies defense
approach in the PaaS model

Internal

(Lemon, 2002)

External

- Reduces the time of SYN
messages received in the PaaS

Internal
SYN Flooding

External
Internal

model

- Increase in latency

- Lowers the performance
of the cloud system

- Some of the legitimate
ACK packets could be lost

- Filtering mechanism in the

- Not reliable due to the

IaaS model

limited use of this method

- May affect the
External
Internal

- Firewall mechanism in the

performance of the

IaaS model

networking system in the
cloud

External

- Active monitoring mechanism
in the IaaS model (Schuba et

Internal

al., 1997)

- Decreases resource
performance in the cloud
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External
Internal

- Configuring VMs in the PaaS
model

Smurf Attack
External
Internal
External

- Configuring network
resources in the IaaS model

- Prevented when writing a
source code mechanism in the

Internal

SaaS model (Fu & Shi, 2012)

External

- Performs the array bounds
checking mechanism in the

Buffer Overflow

Internal

SaaS model (Fu & Shi, 2012)

External

- Runtime instrumentation
mechanism in the SaaS model

Internal

- Time consumption

- Decreases resource
performance in the cloud

- Not reliable

(Fu & Shi, 2012)
- Analyzes the static and

External
Internal

dynamic code mechanism in
the SaaS model (Fu & Shi,
2012)
- May not currently affect any

External
Ping of Death
Internal

cloud service model; however,
the attack could be developed
in the future
- May not currently affect any

External
Land.c
Internal

cloud service model; however,
the attack could be developed
in the future
- May not currently affect any

External
Teardrop.c
Internal

cloud service model; however,
the attack could be developed
in the future

- Not reliable
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2.3.2

Cloud Computing Authentication and Authorization Protocols

The identity authentication process is considered the principal gateway to cloud-based
services. Therefore, these gateways have become increasingly susceptible to adversaries
who may use DoS attacks to permanently close these gateways. Numerous authentication
protocols exist that can verify identities and protect conventional networked applications.
However, these authentication protocols may themselves introduce DoS risks when used
in cloud-based applications. This risk introduction could occur on account of the utilization
of a heavy verification process that can consume the cloud resources and disable the
application service.
This section provides an example of one of these protocols. In addition, some of the
proposed authentication protocols utilized in cloud computing are presented. Furthermore,
the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which is a widely used authorization protocol for cloud systems,
is described. Finally, the Host Identity Protocol (HIP), which is a DoS-resistant
authentication protocol in conventional network systems, is explained.

Server

User
User session request, Rclient
Rserver, [{Rclient, gb mod p}client ]server
[{Rserver, ga mod p}server ]client

Figure 2.8: Mutual authentication protocol
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An example of authentication protocols that can independently introduce internal DoS risks
is shown in Fig. 2.8. The goal of this protocol is to cross-authenticate the user and server.
This protocol uses the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Diffie & Hellman, 1976),
where a, b, p, and g are the values of Diffie-Hellman, as shown in Fig. 2.8. In this protocol,
once the server receives a request from a user, the server begins generating the secret value,
b. Subsequently, the server computes the exponential value, gb mod p. Moreover, the server
encrypts the nonce of the user and the exponential value via the user public key. Finally,
the server digitally signs the encrypted message. All of these processes are executed by the
server, which consumes considerable resources without determining whether the request is
legitimate. This mutual authentication, which is vulnerable to the DoS attack, is similar to
the two-way authentication version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
(Dierks, 1999).
Another example of a protocol that independently introduces DoS risk is Kim et al.’s
protocol (Kim, Fujioka, & Ustaoğlu, 2009), which aims to securely authenticate the key
exchange between participants. In this protocol, once the server receives the first message,
the server begins computing an exponential value and generates the key. Accordingly, the
server resources can become exhausted by the initial requests.
Many authentication protocols have been proposed for the cloud-computing environment.
However, they do not protect against DoS attacks. Yassin et al. (A. A. Yassin, Jin, Ibrahim,
Qiang, & Zou, 2013) proposed an authentication process that uses a one-time password for
mutual authentication of the user and cloud server. Although Yassin et al.’s authentication
scheme defends against replay attacks, it cannot defend against DoS attacks. Other cloudbased authentication protocols for DoS prevention have been proposed (e.g., Choudhury et
al. (Choudhury, Kumar, Sain, Lim, & Jae-Lee, 2011), Hwang et al. (Hwang, Chong, &
Chen, 2010), Jaidhar (Jaidhar C. D, 2012), and Tsaur et al. (Tsaur, Li, & Lee, 2012)). These
protocols use a smart card reader for the authentication process. Therefore, the cloud users
should use a card reader device for each authentication by the cloud server. Additionally,
the scheme of Yassin et al. (A. a. Yassin, Jin, Ibrahim, & Zou, 2012) recommends the use
of another third-party device, such as a fingerprint scanner.
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Figure 2.9: Example of social authentication icons (Darwell, 2013)
Furthermore, the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework was developed by Hardt in 2012
(Hardt, 2012) as an improvement on the previous OAuth 1.0 protocol (Hammer-Lahav,
2010). Currently, it is implemented as an authorization framework (as OAuth) by many
vendors, such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Yahoo (Boyd, 2012), as shown
in Fig. 2.9. This protocol was developed to control third-party client accessibility to HTTP
services. For instance, assume that a user would like to play the Angry Birds game and post
the score and screenshots on his/her Facebook account. In this scenario, the user must give
the Angry Birds app access to his/her Facebook account so the app can obtain the user’s
information and post the game score on the user’s behalf. By employing OAuth, this can
be done in such a way that, when the app needs to access any Facebook services (i.e.,
posting), OAuth will redirect the user back to the Facebook login screen to login into the
user’s Facebook account. In this case, the user gives his/her username and password to
Facebook itself, not to the Angry Birds app. Facebook will then ask whether the user wants
to authorize this app. It will then create an access token that works like a password. This
token only allows the app to access the user’s Facebook account information and post the
user’s score when needed.
Thus, the OAuth 2.0 protocol permits a third-party client, such as an application, to access
a server’s resources (user profile information) with rules and permissions in a way that
avoids exchanging the user’s credentials. The OAuth 2.0 protocol participants are as
follows:
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Client: An application (e.g., Angry Birds app) that uses an application program
interface (API) (Siriwardena, 2014) to access the resource owner’s (user’s) protected
resources (profile) with his/her authorization.



Resource owner: The user of the application who grants access to his/her protected
resources (profile) that are available on the resource server (e.g., a Facebook user
profile server).



Resource server: The server (Facebook user profile server) that hosts the protected
resources of the user (his/her profile). Typically, this server provides the API and hosts,
and protects the user’s data (profile).



Authorization server: The server that receives the resource owner’s (user’s)
permissions to generate the access token and then sends it to the client (Angry Birds
app). Therefore, the client can access the protected resources (user’s profile). The
authorization server (Facebook server) can be the same as the resource server
(Facebook user profile server).

Resource owner

3 Authorization Grant
4 Access Token
Authorization Server
User

Resource Server

Figure 2.10: Overview of the OAuth 2.0 protocol
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As shown in Fig. 2.10, the OAuth 2.0 protocol works as follows:
1. The client (Angry Birds app) sends an authorization request to the resource owner
(user).
2. The resource owner (user) sends an authorization grant to the client (Angry Birds
app). However, the type of authorization granted is determined based on the
authorization request received from the client. Examples of authorization grant
types are as follows:


Authorization code grants: In this type of grant, the resource owner (user)
grants an authorization code to the client (Angry Birds app) after an
authorization server (Facebook server) authorizes the resource owner. The
client uses this authorization code and therefore does not need the credentials
of the resource owner. An authorization code grant is a secure type of grant.



Implicit grants: This type of grant is implemented on the client (Angry Birds
app) using software language so that the access token is immediately given to
the client. Although the implicit grant reduces the protocol overhead, it may
introduce security threats.



Resource owner password credential grants: For this type of grant, the
access token is given to the client (Angry Birds app) using the credentials of the
resource owner (username and password). This grant type can be implemented
when the resource owner (user) completely trusts the client.



Client credential grants: This type of grant can be implemented to limit access
to the server’s secure resources, such as Facebook user profiles. Therefore, it
can be implemented when the client (Angry Birds app) is the owner of the
secure resource (Facebook user profiles) or when the client has been granted
permission to access the secure resource in the past.

3. The client (Angry Birds app) sends the received authorization grant to the
authorization server (Facebook server) to obtain an access token.
4. The authorization server (Facebook server) authenticates the client (Angry Birds
app) and validates the authorization grant. It then issues an access token that will
be known by the resource server (Facebook user profile server) and sends it to the
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client. This access token is used instead of the standard username and password
authentication. The access token has an expiration time. Once it expires, an optional
refresh process can be implemented by reapplying the third step of the protocol.
5. The client (Angry Birds app) sends the received access token to the resource server
(Facebook user profile server) so that it may access the secure resource (user’s
profile data).
6. The resource server (Facebook user profile server) validates the access token and
then allows the client (Angry Birds app) to access the resource (user’s profile data).
For instance, the client could share the game’s achievements of the user on his/her
Facebook timeline.

User

Web server application

Google servers

1: Request token

2: User login & consent

3: Authorization code

4: Exchange code for token

5: Token response

6: Use token to call Google API

Figure 2.11: Authorization process of Google's OAuth 2.0 for web server
applications
However, if the OAuth 2.0 protocol is not securely implemented, the protocol could
introduce security breaches into the system, such as in Google’s implementation of the
OAuth 2.0 protocol (Google Developers, 2014). This implementation of the OAuth 2.0
protocol for web server applications was developed so that Google’s API could be
implemented in web server applications and frameworks, such as game applications. As
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shown in Fig. 2.11, the authorization process of the implemented protocol works as
follows:
1. The web server application (app) requests the token.
2. The user is redirected to the uniform resource locator (URL) that is assigned by
Google. This URL contains some information, such as access type.
3. Google servers perform the authentication task. Once Google servers authenticate
the user, the web server application (app) receives the authorization code.
4. To obtain an access token, the web server application (app) exchanges the user’s
data and obtains an authorization code with the Google servers. To enable future
offline access, the web server application receives the refresh token first; this token
information is then exchanged with the Google servers to obtain the access token.
5. The Google servers send the access token to the web server application (app).
6. The web server application (app) uses the received token to call Google’s API.
For offline access, in this implementation, the refresh token is stored on the web application
server’s storage device for future communication. The stored refresh token remains valid
until it is revoked by the user (Google Developers, 2014). These stored data can lead to
security flaws that exhaust the storage resources of the web servers, as detailed in Section
5.2.2.
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) (Moskowitz, Nikander, Jokela, & Henderson, 2008) is an
example of an authentication protocol that is used to identify a DoS attack on a
conventional network. However, this protocol cannot be implemented in the application
layer to defend against external DoS attacks. This is because HIP is based on the host
identity on the network layers in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model.
Moreover, it is configured and controlled at an operating system level. Furthermore, any
authentication protocol that is based on IP address verification, such as the Internet
Protocol Security (IPSec) protocol, makes it difficult to hide the identity of the participants.
HIP solves the DoS-SYN flooding attack that was presented in Section 2.2 by creating
additional processing to establish a new TCP connection between two participants. This
new four-way handshake process is based on a crypto-puzzle that requires the user to

27

reverse a hash function. Consequently, the puzzle-solving process forces the user to
complete some computational operations. Verifying the puzzle solution is a short operation
on the server side.

2.3.3

Authentication Protocol Validation

Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) proposed a belief logic (Burrows, Abadi, &
Needham, 1989) to analyze the security requirements of authentication protocols.
Subsequently, logic by Syverson and Van Oorschot (SVO) (P. F. Syverson & Van
Oorschot, 1994) was introduced as an extension model to address some of the limitations
of BAN. SVO uses some of its own notations in addition to those used in BAN. The
analysis steps of any authentication protocol using SVO (P. Syverson & Cervesato, 2001)
are as follows:
1) Initial assumption: An assumption of the initial status of the protocol.
2) Received message assumption: An assumption regarding the messages each party
receives when the protocol is completed in a trusted fashion.
3) Comprehension assumption: An assumption regarding what the receiver believes,
and what parts of the received message are unknown.
4) Interpretation assumption: An assumption of how each party interprets the received
messages.
5) Derivation: It derives the analysis goals using the previous assumptions.
For further security validation, any protocol design in general should be investigated in
terms of its vulnerability to DoS attacks using the cost-based model approach proposed by
Meadows (Meadows, 2001). This approach aims to prevent DoS attacks during the
authentication process. It depends on the exhausted resource costs of the participants. The
cost-based model approach logically demonstrates the effectiveness of the protocols in
preventing DoS attacks. The computation cost is defined as the total resource usage cost of
the requester (user) and responder (server) when both participate in the authentication
protocol. The cost is computed during the process until a DoS attacker is detected and is
prevented from participating. The total cost of the requester is the total estimated cost of
each operation involved in the authentication process on the requester’s side until the
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authentication process ends. However, the total cost of the responder is the total estimated
cost of each operation during the authentication process until the requester is determined
to be either a legitimate requester or attacker.
Meadows (Meadows, 2001) proposed the categories of inexpensive, medium, and
expensive for an operation’s cost. This approach assumes that the exponential, signature
check, and signature operations performed during an authentication process are expensive.
The pre-calculated exponential value, and the encryption and decryption operations are
medium cost. Any other operations are inexpensive.

2.3.4

Review Summary

The literature review on DoS-aware cloud-based authentication protocols is summarized
in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Literature review summary

Proposed Protocol

OAuth 2.0 (Hardt, 2012)

HIP (Moskowitz et al., 2008)

Yassin et al. (A. A. Yassin, Jin,

DoS awareness

Based on the
implementation

Yes

Implementation

Uses third-party

environment

device

Conventional
network and cloud
computing
Conventional
network

No

Cloud computing

Yes

Cloud computing

Hwang et al. (Hwang et al., 2010)

Yes

Cloud computing

Jaidhar (Jaidhar C. D, 2012)

Yes

Cloud computing

Tsaur et al. (Tsaur, Li, & Lee, 2012)

Yes

Cloud computing

Yes

Cloud computing

Ibrahim, Qiang, & Zou, 2013)
Choudhury et al. (Choudhury et al.,
2011)

Yassin et al. (A. a. Yassin, Jin,
Ibrahim, & Zou, 2012)

No

No

No

Yes
(smartcard reader)
Yes
(smartcard reader)
Yes
(smartcard reader)
Yes
(smartcard reader)
Yes
(fingerprint scanner)

Based on the implications of the above literature review summary, an authentication
protocol suite against DoS attacks is herein proposed that works in the cloud-computing
environment. Moreover, it considers the security requirements of the authentication
protocol without using third-party devices.
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Chapter 3
3

Cloud-Based Secure Authentication Module 1 (CSAM-1)
Protocol for Private and Community Cloud Computing

In this chapter, the first module of the proposed cloud-based secure authentication (CSAM1) protocol suite to defend against external DoS attacks is presented. The CSAM-1 protocol
is developed so that the total computational cost of the user side is greater than the resource
operations cost of the cloud-based server when they jointly participate in the authentication
process. The main objective of the CSAM-1 protocol is to defend against external DoS
attacks. Therefore, CSA can be implemented and configured in private and community
cloud computing because the infrastructure and platforms in these deployment models are
secured by the organizations. On the other hand, in public and hybrid cloud computing
models, different infrastructures are communicated together. Thus, there is no guarantee
that all infrastructures have the same security level. The solution to this problem is
addressed in Chapter 4. Table 3.1 shows the notations that are used in the CSAM-1 protocol
suite.
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Table 3.1: Notations of the CSAM-1 protocol
Notation
Cloud_user
Cloud_server
Cloud_user ID (CUID)

Unique encrypted text (UET)

Session key (SK)

Description
Cloud user/client
Cloud server/service provider
Cloud_user ID
Unique encrypted text; the key of the UET is known only by
cloud_server
Session key

A

A set of random integers of the server challenge function

S

A subset sum of the server challenge functions

B

A binary vector representing the challenge function solution

Rcloud_server

The nonce that is generated by cloud_server

T

Timestamp

KX

Secret key of X

MK

Master secret key of cloud_server

Tag

An encryption of timestamp and cloud user ID by master secret
key of cloud_server

CSAM-1 consists of two protocols, as shown in Fig. 3.1. The first protocol is used for the
registration process, which is an agreement process between the participants (cloud_user
and cloud_server) about specific shared information. Thus, the participants can use that
information during the operation of the second CSAM-1 protocol. The second protocol is
an adaptive-based identification and authentication protocol that works against DoS
attacks. This protocol is developed based on the cost-based model approach. In addition,
this protocol is used for the authentication process, which includes all operations that occur
on the basis of initially agreed upon information of the previous protocol. As a result,
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cloud_server can confirm the identity of cloud_user and then completes the authentication
process, or it can detect and then prevent an intruder in the case of a DoS attack.

Figure 3.1: CSAM-1 protocols

3.1 Registration Protocol
In the CSA registration protocol, cloud_user and cloud_server share the required identity
data to register cloud_user in the cloud_server database.

cloud_server

cloud_user

New request includes cloud_user information

Request confirmation data

Response to confirmation data

UET||Tag, CUID

Figure 3.2: Registration protocol in CSAM-1
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As shown in Fig. 3.2, the registration process begins when cloud_user submits all the
required information to cloud_server. This information includes the first name, last name,
organization name, email address, and any other information that is required by the cloud
service provider. Cloud_server validates the received information, stores it in a database,
and then sends a validation email message to cloud_user to confirm cloud_user’s
information. If cloud_user does not confirm his/her information after a specific amount of
time, cloud_server deletes cloud_user’s information. After validation, cloud_server
activates cloud_user’s account. At the same time, cloud_server generates a CUID and a
UET. This UET is encrypted by cloud_server’s master key (MK), which is known only
by cloud_server.

CUID

Last SK

Last T

Figure 3.3: UET structure in CSAM-1
As shown in Fig. 3.3, the UET contains cloud_user information and other information that
is created by cloud_server during the processes of the CSA protocols, such as the CUID,
last session key, and last timestamp. The UET is a piece of information that is not stored
on cloud_server; rather, it is sent to the requesting cloud_user.
CUID

Tag = E ( T + CUID, MK )

PSK

Other cloud_user’s information

Figure 3.4: Cloud_user (lookup) database table structure
To identify cloud_user and to avoid the risk of DoS attacks, cloud_server generates a tag
that contains a timestamp (T) and CUID that are both encrypted by cloud_server’s MK.
Cloud_server then adds CUID and tag information to cloud_user’s table in its database
(referred to as the lookup table), as shown in Fig. 3.4. It should be noted that the number
of entities in the lookup table depends on the number of confirmed registered cloud_users.
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In the next step, cloud_server sends UET along with the tag to cloud_user. Once
cloud_user receives the required data from cloud_server, both cloud_user and
cloud_server agree upon the pre-shared key. The pre-shared key is created using a key
derivation function and a shared secret. Cloud_user and cloud_server agree upon the key
derivation function and a shared secret at the end of the registration protocol, which is
exchanged via a secure channel in a very restricted environment. This approach is the same
approach of the pre-shared key (PSK) agreement that used in the UMTS and WPA2
protocols (Southern, Ouda, & Shami, 2013). Consequently, cloud_user stores the UET
and a pre-shared key for a future authentication process. Cloud_server stores PSK in the
lookup table.
Even if cloud_user is registered to cloud_server, cloud_user cannot access the services
available through cloud_server unless cloud_server identifies and authenticates
cloud_user. To perform the identification and authentication protocol that is ready to
defend against external DoS attacks, CSAM-1 provides an outer shield to the authentication
protocol. This helps in distinguishing legitimate cloud_users from DoS attackers. The
CSA-adaptive based identification and authentication protocol is designed to provide this
outer shield as described in the following section.

3.2 Identification and Authentication Protocol
The adaptive-based identification and authentication protocol utilizes the cost-based model
approach. Before applying the computational power of the authentication protocols in the
server side, users are asked to prove their sincere commitment for receiving the
cloud_server services. This validation of commitment can be achieved by any technique
that can force the users to utilize a significant amount of computational power before the
servers utilize them in order to confirm their genuine requests. Currently, “client puzzles”
is a common technique that realizes the cost-based model approach (Juels & Brainard,
1999).
In this research study, a technique based on a one-way function is proposed to realize the
cost-based model approach. A cryptographic knapsack problem has been chosen because
it is a strong one-way function, while also being flexible for adaptability (Salomaa, 1996).
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The knapsack problem is strong because it is known to be an NP-complete problem
(Manber, 1989). It is to be noted that the problem is considered as NP-complete when the
problem is in both NP (nondeterministic polynomial time) and NP-hard. In addition, the
main characteristic of the selected one-way function in this protocol is an adjustable
difficulty level to solve the puzzle based on the efforts of the users.
In cryptography, a knapsack problem is described as follows. Given a set of positive
integers (i.e., items) A = a1 … an and a positive integer value S. It needs to be determined
if there is non-empty subset of a1 … an whose values sum to S. For example, let the set of
items in knapsack A be (13, 54, 28, 73, 3, 36) and the summation S be 89. Therefore,
finding the elements 13, 73, and 3 solves the problem because their summation is equal to
89. In other words, finding a binary vector, B, such that A . B = S solves the problem. In
this example, B is the vector (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0); therefore, A . B = 13 + 73 + 3, which is 89.
Typically, the complexity of the knapsack problem depends on the size of knapsack A (the
number of its items; for example, n) and on the number of ones (for example, m) in binary
vector B. If the number of items in A (i.e., n) is small, then an exhaustive search for the
solution is practical. Furthermore, if the number of ones in B (i.e., m) is small compared to
n, then a solution can be found in a reasonable time via dynamic programming algorithms.
Consequently, by adjusting the values of n and m, determining the difficulty level of the
knapsack problem, and hence the cost-based approach, can be adaptively realized.
The CSAM-1 protocol considers n = 512 items in the knapsack puzzle problem. These
items are fixed integer values that both parties should agree upon during the registration
protocol. Based on the experimental result (see Section 5.2.1), obtaining vector B forces
cloud_user to become involved in finding the solution to 2512 subsets, which is a very large
time interval and significant resource consumption. The number of subsets of items is
adjustable based on the required efforts of the participants. Moreover, the chosen items that
are used during the summation process are determined by hashing the values of CUID,
MK, and Rcloud_server using SHA2-512, where MK is the master secret key of cloud_server.
The result of the hash function is a 512-bit stream. Moreover, the subset of the 512-bit
stream that includes a specific number of ones (m) represents the required vector, B, of the
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knapsack problem. For example, if the protocol is developed to let m = 55, cloud_server
takes the subset of the 512-bit stream that includes the first 55 ones. Increasing the value
of m makes the process of solving the puzzle more difficult, which would magnify the
time-consuming nature of the puzzle-solving process. The hashing process is mandatory to
verify the subset summation value (S) of cloud_user after the calculation process.

cloud_server

cloud_user
Session request, CUID, Tag

S, Rcloud_server, Tag, request UET

CUID, UET||Tag, vector B, S, Rcloud_server

E(SK, PSK), UET||Tag

UET||Tag

Figure 3.5: Adaptive-based identification and authentication protocol in CSAM-1
The function of this adaptive-based identification and authentication protocol process
shown in Fig. 3.5 is described as follows:
Cloud_user sends a request for a service along with the CUID and tag to cloud_server.
At this point, cloud_server blocks any CUID that has performed three consecutive requests
within a low time threshold to prevent DoS attacks. The attacker may attempt to launch a
DoS attack by sending requests with randomly generated CUID values. In this case, the
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cloud_server easily check the received tag with the stored tag in the lookup table. If these
are not identical, the request is considered an attacker request. It should be noted that
cloud_server is not required to perform an encryption process to check the tag value.
Cloud_server directly replies to cloud_user by sending the puzzle element as a challenge,
which is the subset summation value (S) along with a cloud_server nonce (Rcloud_server)
and a new generated tag. Cloud_server generates a new tag value and updates the lookup
table in the database each time it checks the tag value to preserve the refreshment property
of the protocol.
Cloud_server asks cloud_user to prove its sincere commitment to receiving the
cloud_server services by asking for the UET as well as the puzzle solution to the (S) value.
The expected solution for this challenge is vector B.
Once cloud_user calculates and obtains vector B, it sends the CUID and UET, received
tag, vector B, S value, and received Rcloud_server to cloud_server for validation. At this
point, cloud_server has all the information required to validate the authentication requests;
therefore, cloud_server can apply the validation process to only a few operations, such as
those outlined below.
First, cloud_server validates the received tag by comparing it with the stored tag in the
lookup table. Second, cloud_server checks the subset of item ai by securely hashing
(CUID, MK, Rcloud_server) and comparing the resulting vector with received vector B to
determine whether they are identical.
If any of the two previous conditions do not apply, cloud_server drops the request and
considers it to be an attacker’s request. However, once the cloud_user request passes both
conditions, cloud_server decrypts the UET and validates the decrypted information
containing the CUID. Then, cloud_server generates a new tag and updates its field in the
lookup table.
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To complete the authentication process once the protocol determines that cloud_user is
legitimate, both participants agree on the SK for future interactions. In addition, they can
agree on the sub-session key if they later require a refreshment process. Therefore,
cloud_server generates the SK, which is encrypted via a pre-shared key. Moreover,
cloud_server adds both the SK and T information to the UET. Consequently,
cloud_server is protected against DoS attacks on the storage space because the UET is
never saved in the cloud_server. Furthermore, cloud_server can apply the refreshment
property of the session key for future communication by adding the SK to the UET.
Therefore, cloud_server sends the generated SK to the cloud_user that is encrypted by
the pre-shared key, along with the modified UET and newly generated tag. It should be
noted that the notation E(SK, PSK) means that the SK is encrypted by the PSK.
Cloud_user first confirms the received encrypted SK by encrypting timestamp T using
SK. It then returns encrypted SK, along with the received UET and tag, to cloud_server.
Therefore, cloud_server decrypts the UET, validates the CUID, and obtains the SK. It then
confirms SK by decrypting the received timestamp T using the SK.
Later, the two parties can agree regarding the sub-session keys by re-applying the processes
of the authentication protocol. Accordingly, cloud_server can generate a sub-session key
and add it to the UET without storing it in the cloud system.

3.3 Discussion
The authentication protocol suite is proposed to identify and authenticate cloud users in the
SaaS model and provide a strong shield against external DoS attacks. By integrating the
client puzzle problem and utilization of the UET, security breaches that may lead to DoS
attacks can be avoided.
In the CSAM-1 protocol suite, we rely on the computational complexity theory to
determine different levels of client-puzzle solution difficulties. Thus, the identity protocol
is designed to minimize the computational cost incurred by the cloud resources; moreover,
the computation cost incurred by cloud users is adjustable based on the service’s
sensitivity. The high computational cost influences an attacker launching a DoS attack with
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a massive number of requests from his/her device. However, if the attacker uses many
different devices to launch DoS attacks, the cloud system will not be exhausted because
the attack can be detected at an early stage of the authentication process.
In practical terms, the proposed CSAM-1 protocol suite can be implemented in the SaaS
model of cloud computing systems because the protocol simply relies on basic hardware
and software requirements of both the cloud systems and users.
However, the proposed CSAM-1 protocol suite does not consider the possible DoS risks
faced by the other cloud service models, such as PaaS or IaaS. Although the CSAM-1
protocol suite can be implemented on private and community cloud models at this stage, it
must be redeveloped for implementation on public or hybrid cloud models, as discussed in
Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
4

Cloud-Based Secure Authentication Module 2 (CSAM-2)
Protocol for Public and Hybrid Cloud Computing

In this chapter, a second module of the cloud-based secure authentication (CSAM-2)
protocol suite is proposed to prevent DoS attacks in PaaS and IaaS cloud-computing service
models. In addition, it securely authenticates and identifies cloud users who would like to
use cloud services. The CSAM-2 protocol suite relies on four protocols, as shown in Fig.
4.1. These protocols sequentially progress so that each protocol process starts its execution
based on the output of the previous protocol. In the registration protocol, the cloud user
begins the registration process in the cloud server. Once the user is registered, the cloud
server in the identification and authentication protocol determines whether the cloud user
is a legitimate user. Once the external DoS attack is prevented, the service management
and allocation protocol directs the cloud user to the requested service, which prevents the
risks of internal DoS attacks. Finally, once the legitimate user is directed to the host of the
requested service, the host session and authentication protocol validates the cloud user to
access the requested service.

Figure 4.1: CSAM-2 protocols
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The notations of the CSAM-2 protocol suite are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Notations of the CSAM-2 protocol
Notation
cloud_user
cloud_server
v_service_host

Description
Cloud user/client
Cloud server/service provider
Virtual host of the requested service

CUID

Cloud user ID

SVID

Service ID

ACL

EUET

Access control list; an information set issued by cloud_server to allow
cloud_user access to the requested services
Extended unique encrypted text, the key of which is known only by
cloud_server

SK

Session key

A

A set of random integers of the server challenge function

S

A subset sum of the server challenge function

B

A binary vector representing the challenge function solution

Rcloud_server

The nonce that is generated by cloud_server

T

Timestamp

KX

Secret key of X

MK

Master secret key of cloud_server

Tag

Tagv_service_host

An encryption of the timestamp and CUID by the master secret key of
cloud_server
An encryption of time stamp and CUID by the secret key of v_service_host
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4.1 Registration Protocol
In this protocol, the cloud server registers and activates the cloud user in its own database.
It is to be noted that depends on successful completion of module 1, this protocol is similar
to the registration protocol in CSAM-1 with UET structure that is extended to hold extra
security information. In this protocol, the cloud server issues an extended unique encrypted
text (EUET) for the cloud user to employ in the future protocols’ processes. Therefore, a
user registration protocol is proposed to enable both participants (cloud_user and
cloud_server) to communicate to share mandatory identification information.
Accordingly, it can register cloud_user in the cloud_server database.
In the user registration protocol, cloud_user initiates a request to cloud_server that
includes the cloud_user information, as shown in Fig. 4.2. This information contains, but
is not limited to, the cloud_user name, phone number, email address, and other information
that cloud_server should maintain in its database. Cloud_server stores the information in
its database and then sends an email message to cloud_user to validate the email address.
Once cloud_user responds to the validation message, it is deemed an activated user. On
the other hand, if cloud_user does not respond to the message within a specified period,
the cloud_user information is deleted from cloud_server. Hence, the goal of registering
and activating cloud_user is achieved. Once the registration succeeds, cloud_server issues
a CUID and a EUET that is encrypted by its own MK.
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cloud_server

cloud_user

New request includes cloud_user information

Request confirmation data

Response to confirmation data

EUET||Tag, CUID

Figure 4.2: User registration protocol in CSAM-2
In addition, Cloud_server generates a tag by encrypting the timestamp (T) and CUID by
its own MK. Cloud_server then inserts the CUID and tag into the cloud_user information
table (lookup table). As mentioned in CSAM-1 (Chapter 3), the number of entities in the
lookup table depends on the number of confirmed registered cloud_users. In addition,
cloud_server uses the tag to identify cloud_user based on the information in the lookup
table and to avoid any risks of DoS attacks.

CUID

Last SK

Last T

Service
request status

(a)

CUID

Last SK

Last T

Service
request status

Direct accessible SVIDs list

Indirect accessible SVIDs list

(b)
Figure 4.3: (a) EUET structure in CSAM-2 with no service assigned to cloud_user;
(b) EUET structure in CSAM-2 with at least one service assigned to cloud_user
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Then, cloud_server sends the CUID to cloud_user along with the EUET and tag. This
EUET includes the CUID and other information required for other CSAM-2 protocols, as
shown in Fig. 4.3. The EUET is sent to cloud_user but is not saved on cloud_server.
Both participants use a shared secret and a key derivation function in a restricted and
secured environment based on a pre-shared key (PSK) agreement. This agreement process
is similar to those used in WPA2 and UMTS protocols (Southern et al., 2013).
Cloud_server then stores the PSK in the lookup table.
As a result, cloud_user in the registration protocol is registered and activated in
cloud_server. Furthermore, cloud_server sends a EUET to cloud_user. In the following
protocol, cloud_server identifies and authenticates the requester who uses the EUET. It is
simultaneously aware of external cloud-based DoS attacks.

4.2 Identification and Authentication Protocol
This section presents the proposed adaptive-based identification and authentication
protocol. Once again, based on successful completion of module 1, this protocol is similar
to the identification and authentication protocol in CSAM-1 with extended UET structure
to hold extra security information. In this protocol, cloud_server determines whether the
requester is a legitimate cloud_user. It then authenticates the legitimate cloud_user. In
this protocol, cloud_server forces cloud_user to perform a computational process before
cloud_server is involved in any computational power.
As presented in Fig. 4.4, the steps of the adaptive-based identification and authentication
protocol are as follows:
Cloud_user sends an initial session request with the CUID and tag to cloud_server.
Cloud_server prevents requests from the same CUID once the consecutive failures reach
the maximum allowed limit (three) in a short timeframe. Cloud_server identifies the CUID
by searching the lookup table in the database and then comparing the received tag to the
stored tag value in the table. If they are not identical, the request is considered an
illegitimate request; else the CUID is identified by cloud_server. It is to be noted that
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cloud_server is not required to decrypt the tag until the tag value is validated in the lookup
table.

cloud_server

cloud_user
Session request, CUID, Tag
S, Rcloud_server, Tag, request EUET

CUID, EUET||Tag, vector B, S, Rcloud_server

E(SK, PSK), EUET||Tag

EUET||Tag

Figure 4.4: Adaptive-based identification and authentication protocol in CSAM-2
Cloud_server responds to the request by sending a puzzle challenge of value S, sending a
nonce (Rcloud_server), and requesting the EUET from cloud_user. In addition, cloud_server
generates a new tag value and updates the lookup table in the database. The new tag
generation process is repeated each time cloud_server checks for the tag value so that the
refreshment property is achieved in this protocol. Cloud_server then sends the newly
generated tag to cloud_user. To prove the commitment of cloud_user, cloud_server
requests the expected puzzle solution (vector B) along with the EUET and tag from
cloud_user.
Cloud_user computes the puzzle solution (vector B) and sends it along with the S value,
received nonce (Rcloud_server), CUID, and EUET in conjunction with a tag to cloud_server.
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Cloud_server validates the received tag and CUID by checking the lookup table.
Cloud_server then verifies whether vector B is identical to the result obtained by secure
hashing (CUID, Rcloud_server, MK). The MK size should not be short to avoid any possibility
of using a brute-force attack to guess the MK. Once vector B is verified, cloud_server
achieves the goal of identifying the legitimate cloud_user. On the other hand, if vector B
is not verified, the request is rejected and is assumed to be a forgery. Cloud_server then
decrypts the EUET and checks the CUID registered in the EUET. Furthermore,
cloud_server issues a new tag, as mentioned in the second step of this protocol.
After cloud_server authenticates cloud_user, both the participants agree to the session SK
for future communications; therefore, cloud_server creates the SK and encrypts it using
the stored PSK. It then adds it and the current T to the EUET, and it sends this modified
EUET in conjunction with the new tag and encrypted SK to cloud_user.
To confirm receipt, cloud_user encrypts the current T using the SK and returns it and the
received EUET along with the received tag to cloud_server.
Cloud_server validates the received tag and EUET. It then decrypts the EUET to obtain
the registered SK, which is then used to decrypt T. To prevent a DoS attack on storage
space, the EUET is not stored in cloud_server. In addition, in this case, T is used instead
of the nonce because cloud_server can verify the operation time of cloud_user.
Furthermore, cloud_server can handle SK’s refreshment property for future
communications by simply adding the new SK information to the EUET and by re-applying
the last three steps of this protocol.
Thus, cloud_server in the identification and authentication protocol can prevent external
DoS attacks. Additionally, it can identify and authenticate the legitimate cloud_user.
Therefore, cloud_user in the next protocol can request available services from the cloud
service provider.

4.3 Service Management and Allocation Protocol
The main goals of the service management and allocation protocol are to enable
cloud_server to allocate to cloud_user the requested available service(s), and to prevent

47

risks of internal cloud-based DoS attacks. To achieve these goals, a service allocation
protocol is herein proposed. In this protocol, cloud_server can organize multiple requests
for a specific service so that deadlocks cannot occur, which thus protects the services from
internal cloud-based DoS attacks.

cloud_server

cloud_user

CUID, EUET||Tag
List of available services (SVIDs), EUET||Tag
CUID, SVID, EUET||Tag
E(ACL, Kv_service_host), EUET||Tagv_service_host

cloud_server
considers
deadlock
algorithm

Figure 4.5: Service allocation protocol in CSAM-2
As depicted in Fig. 4.5, cloud_user sends the CUID and EUET along with the tag to
cloud_server and requests available services (SVIDs). Cloud_server validates the
received CUID by first comparing the received tag with the tag value registered in the
lookup table. Upon successful validation, cloud_server decrypts the EUET, validates the
CUID, and adds the “service requested” status to the EUET. Cloud_server then checks for
SVIDs that are available in the system and sends a list of available SVIDs to cloud_user
along with the EUET and a newly generated tag. Cloud_user then sends a request for a
selected SVID from the received list along with the CUID, EUET, and tag. Cloud_server
denies any request that includes an invalid tag by comparing the received tag with the one
in the lookup table. If the CUID is validated, the requested service might lead to a deadlock
problem because many users have multiple accesses to the requested service or other
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services through the requested service. Thus, to avoid a deadlock problem and to prevent
an internal DoS attack due to a huge number of forged requests for a specific service,
cloud_server controls the service allocation process by applying a deadlock avoidance
strategy. If a request leads to a deadlock problem—for example, by flooding services with
false requests—the request is denied. Hence, cloud_server prevents internal cloud-based
DoS attacks.

Figure 4.6: (a) Service request algorithm for the user; (b) safety algorithm
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One such approach is the banker’s algorithm (Dijkstra, 2002), which can be implemented
so that the “requested services” replace the “current processes.” Moreover, the “required
resources” are the directly and indirectly accessible services that cloud_user requires, as
shown in the algorithm in Fig. 4.6.

CUID

SVIDs
SVIDs that are directly accessible with permission
SVIDs
Related SVIDs that are indirectly accessible with permission
Figure 4.7: ACL structure
If the service can be allocated to cloud_user based on the result of the deadlock avoidance
process, cloud_server issues an ACL that is encrypted using the secret key of the host of
the given service. It adds this additional information to the EUET. The ACL contains
information, such as the CUID, requested SVID with permissions, and all other SVIDs that
are accessible through the requested service with permissions, as shown in Fig. 4.7.
Cloud_server also issues a new tag to access the virtual service host (v_service_host).
However, this tag structure is different from the one used earlier because it is used to
identify cloud_user to v_service_host. The new tag considers timestamp T and the CUID,
both encrypted by the secret key of v_service_host. In this case, cloud_server sends the
encrypted ACL along with modified EUET in conjunction with newly generated
Tagv_service_host to cloud_user. Hence, the goal of allocating cloud_user to the requested
service is achieved. At the end of this protocol, cloud_user has all the required information
to access the requested service after a lightweight authentication process.
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4.4 Host Session and Authentication Protocol
The main goal of the host session and authentication protocol is to authenticate cloud_user
by the host of the requested service in a lightweight authentication process. In this protocol,
cloud_user internally communicates with the required virtual service host. Consequently,
cloud_user must be authenticated by v_service_host before accessing the requested
service; however, this authentication is a lightweight authentication process to ensure that
the requester is a legitimately authenticated cloud_user. As shown in Fig. 4.8, the service
host lightweight authentication protocol functions as follows:

cloud_user

v_service_host
CUID, Tagv_service_host

Acknowledge the request

E(ACL, Kv_service_host)

Figure 4.8: Service host lightweight authentication protocol in CSAM-2
Cloud_user sends a request that includes the CUID and Tagv_service_host to v_service_host.
V_service_host maintains its own lookup table based on the received CUID and
Tagv_service_host. V_service_host then validates cloud_user by decrypting the received tag
and comparing the CUID in Tagv_service_host with the received CUID. This authentication is
a lightweight process because cloud_user is already authenticated by cloud_server. Once
the CUID is identified, v_service_host acknowledges the request. Cloud_user then sends
the encrypted ACL to v_service_host to decrypt it. Next, v_service_host allows
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cloud_user to access the requested service based on the registered information in the ACL.
Hence, cloud_user is authenticated by the host of the requested service.

4.5 Discussion
A second module of a cloud-based secure authentication protocol suite is proposed in this
chapter to add extra layers of protections to securely authenticate and identify a cloud user
and prevent internal risks of DoS attacks. This protocol suite consists of four protocols to
prevent the risks of DoS attacks in multiple cloud-computing service models. We have
combined the EUET application technique, client puzzle problem, and deadlock avoidance
algorithm to prevent security threats that allow attackers to perform cloud-based DoS
attacks.
The proposed CSAM-2 protocol suite integrates several layers of protections. The protocol
suite is designed to identify and authenticate legitimate user requests. Moreover, the
protocol suite is developed to prevent external DoS attackers based on the theory of
computational complexity. Therefore, a cloud-computing server can adjust the difficulty
level of the client puzzle based on the sensitivity of the requested service(s). It thereby
protects the cloud server from external DoS attackers. Additionally, the deadlock
avoidance algorithm is implemented to allocate the requested service(s) to the
authenticated cloud user with the ability to detect threats of internal DoS attacks.
Furthermore, the CSAM-2 protocol suite is developed to enable the host of the requested
service to authenticate the cloud user.
The proposed CSAM-2 protocol suite is practically applicable to different cloud computing
service models. This is because the protocol is developed based on basic software and
hardware components of both participants. The proposed CSAM-2 protocol is reliable on
account of two key reasons. First, the processes of the protocol suite do not overload the
cloud resources. Second, the protocol suite controls access to the cloud service(s) by
implementing the deadlock problem with no cache process. Therefore, the cloud server
does not allocate the cloud user to the requested service(s) if the number of maximum
allowed concurrent accesses to these service(s) is achieved. Furthermore, the maximum
number of allowed accesses to the cloud services is adaptive based on the properties of
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these services. As a result, the CSAM-2 protocol suite is scalable because it can be
expandable based on the size of the cloud-computing system without affecting the cloud
computing resources.
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Chapter 5
5

Security and Performance Validation

In this chapter, the achievement of the security requirements of the authentication protocol
by both CSA protocol modules is verified. In addition, the performance of the protocols is
assessed. The security validation includes the assessment of the CSA protocols via the
Meadows cost-based model approach. The formal verification of the authentication
processes of the protocols is performed via SVO logic. In terms of performance, the
knapsack puzzle technique used in the protocol design is validated. Furthermore, the
implementation of Google’s OAuth 2.0 for web server applications is evaluated. Finally,
the performance of highly computational processes of CSA protocols is evaluated. The
assessment results are compared with the evaluation outcomes of Google’s OAuth 2.0
implementation for web server applications.

5.1 Security Validation
In this section, both modules of CSA protocol suites are analyzed and assessed in terms of
their security implementations. The assessment of the CSA protocols entails an evaluation
of the protocol’s efficiency against DoS attacks by applying a cost-based model approach.
In addition, the security effectiveness of the proposed authentication protocols via SVO
logic is analyzed. This analysis proves that the proposed authentication protocols in CSA
achieve the authentication requirements of an authentication protocol for cloud-computing
systems.

5.1.1

Security Validation of the CSA Protocol Suite via a CostBased Model Approach

The Meadows cost-based model is an approach to analyze the computation process of an
authentication protocol when it comes to its vulnerability to DoS attacks (Meadows, 2001).
This technique is designed to avoid DoS attacks through the authentication operation. This
cost-based model relies on the costs of the exhausted resources of the protocol contributors.
The cost-based model approach practically demonstrates the ability of the protocol to avoid
DoS attacks. In this approach, the computation cost is described as the overall resource
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consumption cost of the user and the server when they become involved in the
authentication process. The cost is computed throughout the authentication process prior
to the process of detecting a DoS attacker, who is then prevented from completing the
authentication process. The user’s total cost is the total cost of every single operation in the
authentication process—from the user’s component until the completion of the
authentication process. Additionally, the servers’ total costs are the total costs of every
operation throughout the authentication process until either the user is authenticated as
legitimate or the attacker is detected. The following categorizations are proposed by
Meadows (Meadows, 2001) for the cost of an operation: expensive, medium, and
inexpensive. The Meadows approach considers that the signature, a check signature, and
the exponential operations that are executed throughout the authentication process are
expensive. The decryption, encryption, and pre-calculated exponential value operations
have medium costs. Every other operation is inexpensive.
As presented in Table 5.1, based on the cost-based model approach, the operation cost of
cloud_user for the CSA protocol is categorized as expensive, particularly when
cloud_user solves the puzzle. The other operations of cloud_user are listed in the medium
or inexpensive categories. However, the maximum operation costs of cloud_server,
including the pre-calculation and decryption operations, are in the medium category. As a
result, the CSA protocol suite is an effective protocol against DoS attacks, in which the
user consumption cost is higher than the consumption cost of the cloud service provider
during the authentication process.
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Table 5.1: Validation of the CSA protocol suite via a cost-based model approach
Cloud_user
CSA protocol
Operation

Cloud_server
Cost
Category

Operation

Cost
Category

Replies directly to the request
via secure hashing of the
Sends the initial request

Inexpensive

received values to obtain the
puzzle element and asks the

InexpensiveMedium

cloud_user for the UET
Identification and
authentication
protocol in CSAM-1
and CSAM-2

Solves the puzzle until the
result is obtained. Then,
sends the result and the

Expensive

Verifies the received
elements. Encrypts the SK

Medium

UET to cloud_server

Decrypts the SK. Encrypts
the timestamp

Medium

Decrypts the UET. Decrypts
the timestamp

Medium

Verifies the request. Replies
Sends the initial request.

Inexpensive

Service allocation

with a list of available

Inexpensive

services

protocol in CSAM-2

Service host

Considered a deadlock

Requests a service

Inexpensive

Sends the initial request

Inexpensive

Acknowledges the request

Inexpensive

Inexpensive

Decrypts the ACL

Medium

algorithm. Encrypts the ACL

Medium

lightweight
authentication
protocol in CSAM-2
Sends the received
encrypted ACL
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5.1.2

Security Validation and Formal Verification of the CSA
Protocol Suite via SVO Logic

Logic-based formal approaches typically are used to analyze the security properties of
cryptographic protocols. These approaches use notations and axioms to study the beliefs
of protocol participants. The consequences of these beliefs are analyzed to determine
whether the protocol’s security goals have been achieved. SVO logic (P. F. Syverson &
Van Oorschot, 1994) is our tool to analyze CSA protocols.
In the proposed CSA protocol suite, the authentication processes are performed in the last
three steps of the adaptive-based identification and authentication protocol in both
modules, CSAM-1 and CSAM-2, as shown in Fig. 5.1. Furthermore, the validation is
performed in the service host authentication protocol in CSAM-2, as shown in Fig. 5.2
further below. In addition, Table 5.2 shows the notations and their descriptions that are
used in the SVO logic.
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Table 5.2: Notations of the SVO
Notation

Description

P believes X

P can take X as true

P received X

P has received a message containing X

P said X

P believes X when P sent it

P says X

P has said X

P has X

X is initially available to P, freshly generated by P, or received by P

P controls X
fresh(X)
P↔

𝑘

Q

P has a jurisdiction on X
X is fresh, and it has not been previously sent
P and Q communicate with each other by a good shared key, k

PKψ(P, k)

k is a public encryption key of P. Only P can read messages encrypted by k

PKσ(P, k)

k is a public signature key of P. Key k verifies that the messages signed by the
corresponding private key k-1 are from P

PKδ(P, k)

k is a public key agreement of P. A Diffie-Hellman key formed with k is shared
with P

{X}k

X is encrypted under key k

⌊𝑋⌋k

X is signed with key k

<X>*P

Received message X is unrecognized by P

The two inference rules of SVO are outlined below.
Modus Ponens:
𝜑

𝜑 → 𝜓
𝜓
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The rule is that whenever the instance φ and the instance φ → ψ (i.e. φ implies ψ) appear
by themselves on lines of a proof then ψ can validly be placed on a subsequent line.
Necessitation:
⊢𝜑
⊢ 𝑃 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝜑
where Г ⊢ 𝜑 means that 𝜑 can be derived from the set of formulas, Г. Using the above
rules, “⊢ 𝜑” means that 𝜑 is a theorem.
The axioms of SVO (P. F. Syverson & Van Oorschot, 1994) are outlined below. We assume
that the reader is got familiar with the notations that described in Table 5.2.
Belief Axioms:
A1. (P believes 𝜑 ^ P believes (𝜑 → 𝜓)) → P believes 𝜓
A2. P believes 𝜑 → 𝜑
A3. P believes 𝜑 → 𝑃 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑃 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝜑)
Source Association Axioms:
𝑘

A4. (P ↔ Q ^ R received {X from Q}k ) → (Q said X ^ Q has X)
A5. (PKσ (Q,k) ^ R received X ^ SV(X, k, Y)) → Q said Y
Key Agreement Axioms:
F0(kP,kQ)

A6. (PKδ (P, kP) ^ PKδ (Q, kQ)) → 𝑃 ↔

𝑄

A7. 𝜑 ≡ 𝜑 [F0(k, kꞋ) / F0(kꞋ, k)]
Receiving Axioms:
A8. P received (X1, ... Xn) → P received Xi for i = 1, ..., n

59

A9. (P received {X}k+ ^ P has k¯ ) → P received X
A10. (P received ⌊𝑋⌋k ) → P received X
Possession Axioms:
A11. P received X → P has X
A12. P has (X1, ... Xn) → P has Xi for i = 1, ..., n
A13. (P has X1 ^ . . . ^ P has Xn) → P has F(X1, ... Xn)
Comprehension Axiom:
A14. P believes (P has F(X)) → P believes (P has X)
Saying Axioms:
A15. P said (X1, ... Xn) → P said Xi ^ P has Xi for i=1,..., n
A16. P says (X1, ..., Xn) → (P said (X1, ... Xn) ^ P says Xi) for i = 1, ..., n
Freshness Axioms:
A17. fresh (Xi) → fresh (X1, ..., Xn) for i = 1, ..., n
A18. fresh (X1, ..., Xn) → fresh F(X1, ..., Xn)
Jurisdiction and Nonce-Verification Axioms:
A19. (P controls φ ^ P says φ) → φ
A20. (fresh (X) ^ P said X) → P says X
Symmetric Goodness Axiom:
𝑘

𝑘

A21. P↔Q ≡ Q↔P
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cloud_server

cloud_user

CUID, UET||Tag, vector B, S, Rcloud_server
E(SK, PSK), UET||Tag
UET||Tag, E(T, SK)

Figure 5.1: Authentication processes of CSAM-1 and CSAM-2
To formally analyze the authentication process in CSAM-1 and CSAM-2 via SVO logic,
as shown in Fig. 5.1, it is important to identify the goal of the protocol. In this protocol, the
goal is stated as follows:
cloud_server authenticates the cloud_user, so that
cloud_server believes (cloud_user says T)
where PSK is a pre-shared key, and SK is a session key.
The protocol analysis is presented in five steps that are the initial state assumption, received
message assumption, comprehension assumption, interpretation assumption, and
derivation.
1) Initial state assumption

The initial state assumption includes all initial statuses of the protocol.
I1. cloud_user believes cloud_user↔

𝑃𝑆𝐾

I2. cloud_server believes cloud_user↔

𝑃𝑆𝐾

cloud_server
cloud_server
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I3. cloud_user believes (cloud_server controls SK)
I4. cloud_server believes fresh(SK)
I5. cloud_user believes fresh(SK)
2) Received message assumption

The received message assumption step indicates what messages each party receives.
R1. cloud_user received {SK} PSK
R2. cloud_server received {T}SK
3) Comprehension assumption

This step states what receivers believe and indicates what parts of the received message are
unknown.
C1. cloud_user believes (cloud_user received {SK}PSK)
C2. cloud_server believes (cloud_server received {T}<SK>*cloud_server)
4) Interpretation assumption

The interpretation assumption step shows what the sender intends by sending the message.
P1. cloud_user believes (cloud_user received {SK}PSK → cloud_user received {SK ^
fresh(SK) }PSK)
5) Derivation

The derivation step derives the analysis goal by the previous assumptions.
D1. cloud_user believes cloud_user received {SK ^ fresh(SK)}PSK
By applying Modus Ponens, C1, P1.
D2. cloud_user believes (cloud_server said SK ^ cloud_server has SK)
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By applying the Source Association (A4), D1, I1, I2, and Belief Axiom.
𝑆𝐾

D3. cloud_user ↔

cloud_server

By applying the Receiving (A9), R1, D2, and Belief Axioms.
D3 shows that cloud_user and cloud_server communicate with each other by a good
shared key (SK).
D4. cloud_server believes (cloud_user said T ^ cloud_user has T)
By applying the Source Association (A4), C2, D3 and Belief Axioms.
D5. cloud_server believes (cloud_user said T)
By applying the Saying (A15), D4, and Belief Axioms.
D6. cloud_server believes (cloud_user says T)
By applying the Jurisdiction (A20), I5, D5 and Belief Axioms.
D6 shows that our analysis goal, which aims to prove that cloud_server authenticates
cloud_user, has been achieved by applying the rules of SVO logic.

cloud_user

v_service_host
CUID, Tagv_service_host

Acknowledge the request

E(ACL, Kv_service_host)

Figure 5.2: Additional authentication processes of CSAM-2
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To formally analyze the additional authentication process in CSAM-2 via SVO logic, as
shown in Fig. 5.2, the goal of the protocol is outlined below.
v_service_host authenticates cloud_user by believing in the received message from
cloud_user, so that:
v_service_host believes (cloud_server says ACL)
where K is a Kv_service_host.
Once again, the protocol analysis is presented in five steps that are the initial state
assumption, received message assumption, comprehension assumption, interpretation
assumption, and derivation.
1) Initial state assumption

The initial state assumption includes all initial statuses of the protocol.
I1. v_service_host believes (cloud_server ↔

𝐾

v_service_host)

I2. cloud_server believes fresh(ACL)
2) Received message assumption

The received message assumption step indicates what messages each party receives.
R1. v_service_host received {ACL}K
3) Comprehension assumption

This step states what receivers believe and indicates what parts of the received message are
unknown.
C1. v_service_host believes (v_service_host received {ACL}<K>*cloud_user)
4) Interpretation assumption

The interpretation assumption step shows what the sender intends by sending the message.
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P1.

v_service_host

believes

(v_service_host

received

{ACL}<K>*cloud_user →

v_service_host received {ACL ^ fresh(ACL) }K)
5) Derivation

The derivation step derives the analysis goal by the previous assumptions.
D1. v_service_host believes v_service_host received {ACL ^ fresh(ACL)}K
By applying Modus Ponens, C1, P1.
D2. v_service_host believes (cloud_server said ACL ^ cloud_server has ACL)
By applying the Source Association (A4), D1, I1 and Belief Axioms.
D3. v_service_host believes (cloud_server said ACL)
By applying the Saying (A15), D2 and Belief Axioms.
D4. v_service_host believes (cloud_server says ACL)
By applying the Jurisdiction (A20), I2, D1, D3 and Belief Axioms.
D4 shows that our analysis goal, which is intended to prove that v_service_host
authenticates cloud_user, has been achieved by applying the rules of SVO logic.

5.2 Performance Validation
In this section, the performance of the knapsack puzzle problem is analyzed via dynamic
programming. This analysis is performed to determine the difficulty levels of the puzzle so
that the challenge technique can be adjusted on the basis of the analysis results.
Furthermore, the implementation of Google’s OAuth 2.0 for web server applications is
evaluated. This indicates that the implementation of Google’s OAuth 2.0 protocol may lead
to a security flaw that exploits low- to medium-size web servers. This threat may occur by
exhausting the storage resources of the web server and by rendering its applications
unavailable. Finally, the effects of the high computation processes of the CSA protocols
are evaluated. These processes include the process of generating random number,
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encrypting plaintext by a well-known key, decrypting ciphertext by a well-known key, and
the hashing process on the cloud server. A comparative analysis of the evaluation results
and those of Google’s OAuth 2.0 implementation for web server applications is
additionally presented.

5.2.1

Knapsack Puzzle Performance Validation

An experiment was conducted to analyze the time complexity of the subset sum (knapsack)
problem. The subset sum can be briefly described as follows. Assume a set of positive
integers A of size n and a positive integer value S. Let us determine whether any non-empty
subset of size m adds up to S. For example, let A be (13, 54, 28, 73, 3, 36), n = 6, and S =
89. It is obvious that for the subset (13, 73, 3), m = 3 solves the problem because their
summation is equal to 89. In other words, let us find a binary vector B such that A . B = S
solves the problem. In this example, B is the vector (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0); hence, A . B = 13 +
73 + 3, which is 89.
It should be noted that, in the identification and authentication protocols, vector B is
generated as the output of the hash function (see Chapters 3.2 and 4.2).
It was mentioned in Chapter 3.2 that the values of n and m are key factors that play a
significant role in the complexity of the subset sum problem. In this experiment, different
values of n and m are chosen for which the time complexity of the subset sum problem is
analyzed. The values of n are 128, 256, and 512, while the values of m range from 1 to 64.
The dynamic programming algorithm is used to solve the puzzle; it is coded in C# and runs
on a quad-core desktop computer with the Windows 8 64-bit operating system, a Core i74770 CPU running at 3.4 GHz, and 32 GB of RAM.
Our experiment indicates that the algorithm solves the puzzle in less than 8 seconds with n
= 128 and for all values of m. When n = 256, and for all values of m, the algorithm solves
the puzzle in less than 12 seconds. Finally, when n = 512 and for all values of m, the
algorithm solves the puzzle in less than 24 seconds. The detailed execution times when n
= 512 are shown by the graph in Fig. 5.3. The graph indicates that the puzzle is solved in
approximately 10 seconds when m is between 25 and 30. When m is between 55 and 60,
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the puzzle is solved in approximately 20 seconds of the execution time. It is also to be
noted that the algorithm hangs on account of the full consumption of system memory when
n = 512 and m is chosen to be higher than 64; i.e., the system resources are exhausted.

Figure 5.3: Response times of the requester (in seconds) with various numbers of
combination items
Based on these results and the corresponding system resource consumption, the
computation costs of solving the subset sum problem can be categorized into three main
categories—inexpensive, medium and expensive—as shown in Fig. 5.3.
According to the findings of the surveys conducted by Nielsen (Nielsen, 1993), 15 to 20
seconds is an acceptable response time for maintaining the user’s attention on a given
application. Therefore, choosing n = 512 and m = 55 is a good configuration of the subset
sum problem. This configuration enables the legitimate user to perform expensive
computations that are acceptable in terms of the system response time (as per the Nielsen
study) especially in terms of his/her initial request.
It is worth mentioning that other researchers (Tritilanunt, Boyd, Foo, & Nieto, 2007) have
shown that the L3 algorithm developed by Lenstra et al. (Lenstra, Lenstra Jr., & Lovász,
1982) can solve the subset sum problem of n = 100 and m = 80 in 2,700 seconds. These
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researchers have contended that this configuration makes the puzzle difficult to solve.
However, this is not true, especially when the dynamic programming algorithm is instead
used. Therefore, the L3 algorithm is not recommended for use in the CSA protocol suite.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the difficulty level of the subset sum (knapsack)
problem, and, hence, the cost-based approach, can be adaptively realized by adjusting the
values of n and m.

5.2.2

Performance Evaluation of the Google OAuth 2.0 Protocol
Implementation

The data storage process in the authentication protocol can cause security breaches in the
web servers. That is, it can be vulnerable to security threats, such as DoS attacks. In the
OAuth 2.0 implementation described in Chapter 2.3.2, web servers store refresh tokens in
their storage devices. They employ these tokens unless the individual user asks for them to
be revoked. In this case, the web server storage capacity may be exhausted by many
requests asking for a refresh token to be stored. As a result, the web server may be unable
to execute legitimate requests, even though it strictly provides only one refresh token to
each individual user. Therefore, this experiment evaluates the risk of implementing
Google’s OAuth 2.0 protocol for web server applications on cloud-based web servers that
have limited resources.
To evaluate the risk of storing data during the authentication process in a cloud-based web
server, an experiment was conducted using the GreenCloud simulator tool developed by
Kliazovich et al. (Kliazovich, Bouvry, & Khan, 2012) and based on the NS2 network
simulator tool (Fall & Varadhan, 2007).
In the experiment, the actual size of the refresh tokens of several vendors was first
determined. Yahoo’s documentation for OAuth 2.0 for web server applications (Google
Developers, 2014) states that the approximate size of the refresh token is 52 bytes. Both
Twitter’s (Twitter, 2015) and Google’s documentation (Yahoo, 2015) for OAuth 2.0
specify approximately 42 bytes for the refresh token. As a result, the average size of the
refresh token in this experiment was set to 48 bytes.
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In this experiment, the main server was configured to manage a single VM as a web server.
The resources of the main server are typically shared by other VMs. Therefore, the VM’s
specifications are generally a quad-core CPU processor, 4 GB of RAM, and a 100-GB hard
disk drive. A reasonable number of stored refresh tokens for this VM is 1,000,000 stored
refresh tokens out of 1,500,000 service users, as in a real business case (LoginRadius, n.d.).
This experiment evaluated the performance of the VM, specifically its load, memory load,
and storage load. It is supposed that, if execution of the VM’s tasks requires over 50% of
the load, the resources of the VM are being exhausted.

Figure 5.4: VM load with multiple requests per second
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Figure 5.5: VM memory load with multiple requests per second

Figure 5.6: VM storage load with multiple requests per second
Figs. 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 present the experimental results for the VM’s load, memory load,
and storage load, respectively. It is noted that the VM’s storage load begins to noticeably
increase at approximately 300 to 500 requests per second. Real web servers can execute up
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to 870 to 1,230 requests per second in extreme situations, depending on the specifications
of the web server (Parallels, 2010). It should also be noted that the storage size in this
experiment was expandable because it depended on two factors: the number of stored
refresh tokens, and the size of the refresh token.
The experimental results indicate that storing data during the user authentication process
leads to security flaws in the web servers that store these data. Therefore, the CSA protocol
suite avoids storing new records during the authentication processes.
To validate the effectiveness of the CSA protocol suite against risks of DoS attacks during
the authentication processes, Section 5.2.3 presents the performance of the most expensive
computation processes of CSA protocols on the cloud server simultaneously performed
with multiple tasks.

5.2.3

Performance Validation of the CSA Protocol Suite

Based on our proposed CSA protocol suite design, the cloud server must proceed with
many tasks. This experiment evaluated the effect of the most expensive computation
processes of the CSA protocol, including generating random number (consider Linuxbased random number generation), encrypting plaintext by a well-known key (consider
AES256 encryption), decrypting ciphertext by a well-known key (consider AES256
decryption), and the hashing process (consider SHA2-512) on the cloud server. This
experiment simulated these tasks using the GreenCloud simulation tool by configuring the
cloud-server specification to be similar to the specification of a virtual web server in our
first experiment. This similarity served to compare the performance of our proposed CSA
protocol with the currently used cloud-computing authorization protocol. In this
experiment, the effects of the most computationally expensive processes of the CSA
protocol on VM load, memory load, and storage load when executing 300 to 500 requests
per second were evaluated.
To obtain the parameters of the CSA protocol processes (“tasks” in GreenCloud), and to
use them in the simulation tool, a real VM with four cores, 4 GB of RAM, and a 100-GB
hard disk drive was implemented. A Linux operating system was installed on this VM to

71

benchmark the tasks and obtain their parameters. The task parameters in the simulation
tool included the task’s million instructions per second (MIPS), input size, output size, and
storage size. To measure the task’s MIPS, Linux provides a CPU speed metric called
BogoMIPS. Therefore, after the task was executed in Linux, the MIPS of the task was
computed by multiplying the used CPU BogoMIPS by the task’s execution time (Pacini,
Ribero, Mateos, Mirasso, & Garino, 2012). From that point, the information of the task’s
file size before and after execution was gathered. Finally, the size of the task’s storage that
was used during the task execution, such as the key size of the AES-256 encryption task,
was obtained.
After executing the four tasks in Linux, the task parameters were computed, as shown in
Table 5.3. These collected parameters were then used in the GreenCloud simulation tool.
Table 5.3: Task parameters obtained from the Linux benchmark experiment
AES-256

AES-256

encryption

decryption

MIPS

3,989

3,826

3,663

3,582

Input size

10,000 bytes

10,016 bytes

10,000 bytes

10 bytes

Output size

10,016 bytes

10,000 bytes

149 bytes

5,121 bytes

Storage size

48 bytes

48 bytes

10 bytes

10 bytes

Task type

SHA-512 hashing

Generating
random number

The charts in Figs. 5.7 to 5.18 present our experimental results after simulating the four
different tasks: AES-256 encryption, AES-256 decryption, SHA2-512 hashing, and
random number generation.
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Figure 5.7: AES encryption VM load

Figure 5.8: AES encryption VM memory load
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Figure 5.9: AES encryption VM storage load

Figure 5.10: AES decryption VM load
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Figure 5.11: AES decryption VM memory load

Figure 5.12: AES decryption VM storage load
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Figure 5.13: SHA-512 hashing VM load

Figure 5.14: SHA-512 hashing VM memory load
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Figure 5.15: SHA-512 hashing VM storage load

Figure 5.16: Generating random number VM load
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Figure 5.17: Generating random number VM memory load

Figure 5.18: Generating random number VM storage load
From that point, the effect of the computationally expensive tasks of our proposed CSA
protocol on the VM were compared to the effects of implementing the OAuth2.0
authentication protocol for the web server tasks simulated in our first experiment.
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Figure 5.19: Comparison of VM load (the same graph is represented in tabular form
in appendix A – Table A.1)
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Figure 5.20: Comparison of VM memory load (the same graph is represented in
tabular form in appendix A – Table A.2)

VM storage load

79

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
300 310 320

Token storage

330 340 350

360 370 380
390 400 410
420 430 440
450 460
470 480
490 500
Number of requests/second

AES Encryption

AES Decryption

SHA512 hashing

Generating random number

Figure 5.21: Comparison of VM storage load (the same graph is represented in
tabular form in appendix A – Table A.3)
As shown in Figs. 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21, significant differences existed in the VM storage
load of the proposed CSA protocol tasks compared with the simulated implementation of
OAuth2.0. These differences were due to the immense amount of stored tokens in the web
server that were used in the authentication process. Therefore, the web server could be
vulnerable to DoS attacks on account of its storing of data during the authentication
processes; this issue was avoided in the proposed CSA protocol design.
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Chapter 6
6

Conclusions and Future Work

The use of software systems in a cloud-computing environment is increasingly common.
DoS attacks are currently a major threat to the availability of cloud services. For each
defense mechanism that has been developed against a DoS attack, an improved attack
appears. The use of defense mechanisms from conventional networks to prevent DoS
attacks in cloud-computing systems is not always efficient. Therefore, a cloud-based secure
authentication (CSA) protocol suite for different cloud-computing deployment models was
herein proposed. The authentication protocol identifies cloud users and securely
authenticates them. Furthermore, it functions as a strong shield against risks of external
and internal DoS attacks.

6.1 Summary of Contributions
The main goal of this thesis is designing and developing a novel cloud-based authentication
protocol suite to securely authenticate the cloud user and to prevent risks of external and
internal DoS attacks. The objectives that support our goal are achieved through the
following tasks:
1. Investigate DoS attacks in conventional networks and identify DoS attacks in
cloud-computing systems.


The risks of DoS attacks were investigated. In addition, existing types of DoS
attacks in conventional network systems and their current defense mechanisms
were investigated (Chapter 2).



The ability of cloud-computing systems to detect DoS attacks was also
examined. Furthermore, we identified a taxonomy of existing DoS attacks and
defenses on cloud-computing systems (Chapter 2).

2. Investigate, propose, and validate a protocol suite that defends against
external DoS attacks.
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An investigation of the risks of DoS attacks in authentication protocols was
presented (Chapter 2).



The first module of a developed cloud-based secure authentication protocol
(CSAM-1) that works against external cloud-based DoS attacks was proposed.
This protocol can be implemented on private and community deployment
models of the cloud system. To avoid security flaws that can produce DoS
vulnerabilities, multiple techniques—including the client puzzle problem and
unique encryption text (UET) application—were integrated into the design of
the proposed authentication protocol. The CSAM-1 protocol suite depends on
the computational complexity theory; therefore, the complexity level of the
puzzle solution is adjustable. This theory was implemented in the protocol
design to minimize the computation costs of cloud resources during the
identification process. Moreover, it makes the computation costs of the cloud
user’s resources adaptable based on the sensitivity of the requested service.
Therefore, the device’s resources of the DoS attacker are involved in high
computation processes when the attacker attempts to initiate a massive number
of attacking requests. The CSAM-1 protocol suite was developed based on
basic hardware and software requirements for cloud users and servers. Thus,
the protocol is practically applicable in SaaS and PaaS service models (Chapter
3).



The results of a validation indicated that the CSAM-1 protocol is a secure
authentication protocol and is invulnerable to DoS attacks. In addition, an
experimental validation of the client-puzzle problem determined that the
challenge technique can be adjusted to implement different difficulty levels of
the puzzle (Chapter 5).

3. Investigate, develop, and validate a protocol suite to defend against internal
DoS attacks.
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The risks of internal cloud-based DoS attacks were investigated. Furthermore,
an existing authorization protocol in cloud computing was examined (Chapter
2).



A second module of the cloud-based secure authentication protocol (CSAM-2)
that defends against internal DoS attacks was proposed. This protocol can be
implemented on public and hybrid deployment models of the cloud system.
Multiple techniques were integrated into the design of the CSAM-2 protocols,
such as the client puzzle problem, extended unique encryption text (EUET)
application, and deadlock avoidance algorithms, to prevent security flaws that
may incur DoS attacks. The design of the proposed CSAM-2 protocol
implements a deadlock avoidance algorithm to allocate the authenticated cloud
user to his/her requested service with avoidance of risks of internal cloud-based
DoS attacks. Additionally, in the CSAM-2 protocol suite design, the host of the
requested service authenticates the cloud user in a lightweight authentication
process. The CSAM-2 protocol suite was developed based on basic hardware
and software requirements for protocol participants. Thus, the protocol is
practically applicable in multiple cloud service models, specifically, SaaS,
PaaS, and IaaS (Chapter 4).



The experimental validation of the CSAM-2 protocol suite indicated that the
CSAM-2 protocol is a secure authentication protocol that is lightweight,
reliable, and scalable. The reliability of the protocol is based on the fact that the
deadlock avoidance algorithm was implemented without cache processing. In
addition, the cloud resources are not overloaded when performing high
computation processes of the protocol. The scalability of the protocol is
attributed to the fact that the maximum accessibility number of each service is
adjustable based on the cloud service properties. Thus, the protocol is
expandable with the size of the cloud system without affecting the cloud
resources (Chapter 5).
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6.2 Future Work
This study examines the ability of a system to detect DoS attacks during authentication
processes through different cloud-computing service models. The proposed future work
will address the following key aspects of this research topic.


The proposed work in this research considers using the service allocation technique
to allocate requested services to users while preventing the risk of internal cloudbased DoS attacks. However, this research does not consider the implementation of
existing resource-allocation techniques, such as allocating services to a specific or
the nearest data center in the cloud computing system. Future work should consider
the integration of the resource-allocation techniques with existing service allocation
technique in this research.



In the design of authentication and identification protocol, the time threshold
between multiple consecutive attempts to prevent further requests from the same
user is an open research area. Further statistical research is needed to determine the
acceptable time threshold.



The present research does not consider existing implementations of software or
hardware firewalls or intrusion detection systems (IDS). Conducting such research
with existing firewalls and IDSs remains an open research area that future work
should address.
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Appendices
Appendix A: The results of the simulation using GreenCloud simulator tool
Table A.1. VM load with different processes
VM load
Number of
requests/second

Generating

Token storage

AES encryption

AES decryption

SHA-512 hashing

300

0.1875

0.2623

0.2561

0.2439

0.2373

310

0.2170

0.2676

0.2584

0.2527

0.2462

320

0.2055

0.2772

0.2703

0.2596

0.2508

330

0.2216

0.2914

0.2780

0.2688

0.2561

340

0.2266

0.3006

0.2906

0.2742

0.2788

350

0.2324

0.3106

0.2941

0.2784

0.2753

360

0.2389

0.3133

0.3029

0.2872

0.2826

370

0.2458

0.3198

0.3083

0.2995

0.2933

380

0.2485

0.3332

0.3175

0.3033

0.3021

390

0.2596

0.3428

0.3271

0.3094

0.2964

400

0.2650

0.3574

0.3367

0.3221

0.3206

410

0.2699

0.3639

0.3474

0.3301

0.3259

420

0.2753

0.3708

0.3531

0.3382

0.3336

430

0.2799

0.3823

0.3631

0.3470

0.3367

440

0.2857

0.3861

0.3692

0.3524

0.3478

450

0.3018

0.3992

0.3811

0.3650

0.3482

460

0.2991

0.4068

0.3923

0.3823

0.3639

470

0.3110

0.4137

0.3957

0.3808

0.3765

480

0.3106

0.4256

0.4045

0.3888

0.3804

490

0.3248

0.4340

0.4145

0.3961

0.3846

500

0.3309

0.4406

0.4233

0.4018

0.3942

random number
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Table A.2. VM memory load with different processes
VM memory load
Number of
requests/second

Generating

Token storage

AES encryption

AES decryption

SHA-512 hashing

300

0.0002

0.2499

0.2385

0.1931

0.1226

310

0.0002

0.2595

0.2567

0.2393

0.2162

320

0.0002

0.2660

0.2676

0.2622

0.2537

330

0.0002

0.2707

0.2753

0.2754

0.2727

340

0.0081

0.2757

0.2803

0.2849

0.2842

350

0.0553

0.2772

0.2851

0.2904

0.2930

360

0.1719

0.2791

0.2881

0.2953

0.2980

370

0.2573

0.2802

0.2898

0.3002

0.3029

380

0.2973

0.2819

0.2913

0.3018

0.3075

390

0.3187

0.2835

0.2928

0.3037

0.3088

400

0.3334

0.2852

0.2944

0.3048

0.3109

410

0.3431

0.2872

0.2962

0.3065

0.3120

420

0.3507

0.2882

0.2979

0.3082

0.3135

430

0.3557

0.2896

0.2998

0.3098

0.3152

440

0.3606

0.2926

0.3006

0.3115

0.3169

450

0.3658

0.2962

0.3024

0.3134

0.3186

460

0.3677

0.3019

0.3055

0.3143

0.3205

470

0.3693

0.3081

0.3092

0.3161

0.3214

480

0.3712

0.3168

0.3148

0.3192

0.3231

490

0.3722

0.3259

0.3208

0.3229

0.3261

500

0.3739

0.3351

0.3298

0.3286

0.3298

random number
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Table A.3. VM storage load with different processes
VM storage load
Number of
requests/second

Generating

Token storage

AES encryption

AES decryption

SHA-512 hashing

300

0.0004

4.797E-07

4.580E-07

7.722E-08

4.904E-08

310

0.0004

4.983E-07

4.928E-07

9.571E-08

8.648E-08

320

0.0004

5.106E-07

5.138E-07

1.049E-07

1.015E-07

330

0.0004

5.198E-07

5.285E-07

1.102E-07

1.091E-07

340

0.0155

5.293E-07

5.382E-07

1.140E-07

1.137E-07

350

0.1062

5.321E-07

5.474E-07

1.162E-07

1.172E-07

360

0.3300

5.359E-07

5.532E-07

1.181E-07

1.192E-07

370

0.4939

5.379E-07

5.564E-07

1.201E-07

1.212E-07

380

0.5709

5.412E-07

5.592E-07

1.207E-07

1.230E-07

390

0.6118

5.443E-07

5.621E-07

1.215E-07

1.235E-07

400

0.6400

5.476E-07

5.653E-07

1.219E-07

1.244E-07

410

0.6587

5.514E-07

5.687E-07

1.226E-07

1.248E-07

420

0.6734

5.534E-07

5.719E-07

1.233E-07

1.254E-07

430

0.6830

5.561E-07

5.756E-07

1.239E-07

1.261E-07

440

0.6923

5.619E-07

5.771E-07

1.246E-07

1.267E-07

450

0.7023

5.688E-07

5.805E-07

1.254E-07

1.275E-07

460

0.7060

5.797E-07

5.865E-07

1.257E-07

1.282E-07

470

0.7090

5.915E-07

5.936E-07

1.264E-07

1.286E-07

480

0.7127

6.083E-07

6.043E-07

1.277E-07

1.292E-07

490

0.7146

6.257E-07

6.160E-07

1.292E-07

1.304E-07

500

0.7178

6.435E-07

6.332E-07

1.314E-07

1.319E-07

random number
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